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Thrice Victimized: Victims of Hurricane Katrina; 
Victims of Violent Crimes; and Victims of Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker  
Gannon Elizabeth Johnson* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Storm victims were raped and beaten, fights and fires broke 
out, corpses lay out in the open, and rescue helicopters and 
law enforcement officers were shot at as flooded-out New 
Orleans descended into anarchy . . . .”1  
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina (“Katrina”) made land-
fall on the coast of Louisiana.2 Cities were battered by winds 
reaching 127 miles per hour,3 the streets were flooded by torrential 
rain, and lightning streaked across the sky. Katrina’s eye was 
supposed to bring a period of calm in the midst of this madness. 
During this brief respite from Katrina’s fury it was crime, not calm, 
 
 * J.D. Candidate (2007), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.A. 
(2004), University of California, San Diego. I would like to convey my endless gratitude and 
appreciation to those who assisted me in developing this Note: my mother, Teresa Johnson; my 
mentor, Paul Evans; my friends, Adam Zuckerman and Zachary Mueller; and the editors of the 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy. 
 1. Allen G. Breed, Lost City: New Orleans in Anarchy as Rage, Frustration Grip 
Desperate Survivors, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at 11. 
 2. AXEL GRAUMANN ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L 
CLIMATIC DATA CTR., HURRICANE KATRINA: A CLIMATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, TECHNICAL 
REPORT 2005–01, at 2 (2005), http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf.  
 Katrina struck Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana at 6:10 a.m. central daylight time as a 
Category 3 storm. Id. By 8:00 a.m. the hurricane was forty miles southeast of New Orleans. Id. 
Previously, Katrina made landfall between Hallandale Beach and North Miami Beach in 
Florida. Id. at 1. 
 3. Id. at 2. At its most terrifying, Katrina’s winds reached 175 miles per hour. Id. When 
the hurricane was forty miles southeast of New Orleans the surrounding areas were reporting 
gusts of 119, 105, 100, and 86 miles per hour. Id. 
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that enveloped New Orleans.4 Havoc reigned, the levees had yet to 
fail, and the worst was still to come.  
Once the storm passed and the levees were breached, the real 
nightmare began. As the survivors5 made their way to the Superdome 
and the Convention Center,6 reports that hooligans were running 
rampant throughout the city—firing guns, looting, and even accosting 
the survivors—abounded.7  
Across the globe people were horrified by countless images and 
tales of the heartless crimes committed in this desperate situation.8 
Though ultimately the most horrific stories would prove to be 
 
 4. See Jim Dwyer & Christopher Drew, Fear Exceeded Crime’s Reality in New Orleans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A1. Thieves ripped the doors from a pawnshop using a chain 
attached to their car. Id. Elsewhere in the city, looters poured into a local Wal-Mart after police 
officers broke in; apparently police commanders had given the officers permission to “take what 
they needed from the store to survive.” Id. (further commenting that a reporter from the New 
Orleans Times-Picayune saw officers grabbing DVDs). Looters also pillaged “drugstores, shoe 
stores[,] and electronic shops” while others unsuccessfully tried to rob banks and automated 
teller machines. Id. 
 5. People remained in the city for a multitude of reasons: some believed they could “ride 
out” the storm; others said they chose to remain despite the evacuation orders to care for older 
residents who were intent on staying. Chris Adams et al., New Orleans Police to Be Pulled Off 
Streets, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A1. Still others stayed behind because they had no 
vehicles with which to leave. Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to 
Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES (Late Edition), Sept. 11, 2005, at 1.  
 6. Director of Homeland Security for New Orleans Colonel Terry J. Ebbert had 
originally decreed that the Superdome would be the only shelter open to hurricane survivors. 
Lipton et al., supra note 5. Unfortunately, the Superdome and the New Orleans Convention 
Center became “deathtraps and symbols of the city’s despair.” Id. 
 7. See generally Anna Badkhen, Hurricane Katrina: Relief Effort, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 
2005, at A19 (stating, “Armed gangs prowled the streets, water washed bloated cadavers onto 
traffic islands, and the only source[s] of light at night were the huge fires that devoured 
structures block after block.”); Cecilia M. Vega, Law and Order in New Orleans, S.F. CHRON., 
Sept. 9, 2005, at A15 (reporting that prisoners at the newly formed “New Orleans Greyhound 
Correctional Center” were being held on charges such as firing upon a helicopter, looting, 
possession of drugs or guns, and attempted murder). 
 8. Ann Scott Tyson, Troops Back from Iraq Find Another War Zone, WASH. POST, Sept. 
6, 2005, at A10 (relaying the statements of national guardsmen on duty in New Orleans). Army 
Specialist Brian McKay stated, “The fear in the eyes of the people, the uncertainty . . . people 
shooting and killing over little bitty things . . . it surprised me. I didn’t think it would be that 
bad in my own country.” Id.; see also Ian Wachstein, Editorial, Shock Waves from the Storm, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at 24 (“Thus, when a Hurricane Katrina strikes and we find 
lawlessness in the form of looting, rapes, robberies and shootings . . . we suddenly realize that 
revolution could be just a breath away . . . .”); cf. Jim Moulton, Op-Ed., The Plight of Hurricane 
Katrina’s Victims, COURIER J. (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 5, 2005, at A10 (“When a band of armed 
outlaws sees one of its members cut in half by a volley from an Apache helicopter, they might 
get the message. If they shoot back, take them all out.”). 
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exaggerations,9 the fact remains that, in Katrina’s wake, a crime wave 
surged through this already crippled city. New Orleans appeared to 
be in a virtual state of lawlessness, and the world watched in shock.  
The blatant disdain for the laws and citizens of New Orleans, for 
humanity itself, inherent in these criminal acts warrants stern 
punishment. Ruthless crimes deserve ruthless sentences. 
Unfortunately, the ability for federal and state courts10 to punish more 
harshly the commission of crimes against vulnerable victims has been 
severely undercut by the storm surge of Apprendi v. New Jersey,11 
Blakely v. Washington,12 and United States v. Booker.13 It is for this 
reason that national and local governments should enact statutes, in 
accordance with Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, explicitly 
authorizing sentence enhancements for those who commit violent, 
personal crimes in the immediate wake of natural disasters such as 
Katrina.14 
In Part I, this Note will (a) provide a short synopsis of federal and 
state sentencing guidelines, and (b) describe how the aforementioned 
cases have diminished the ability of federal and state courts to impose 
sentence enhancements on criminal defendants. Part II of this Note 
will (a) discuss the use of aggravating factors in imposing sentence, 
 
 9. See Angela Tuck, Katrina Blew Journalists’ Skepticism Out the Window, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Oct. 1, 2005, at A15 (stating that a few of the most disturbing stories were “the 
beheading of a baby, the systematic rape of white women[,] and dozens of bodies stacked up in 
a freezer” and expressing concern that some reports of violence may never be confirmed); 
Dwyer & Drew, supra note 4; cf. Donna Britt, In Katrina’s Wake, Inaccurate Rumors Sullied 
Victims, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at B1 (contending that the inaccurate reports of crime 
following Katrina were a product of racial and financial stereotyping that would not have 
occurred if those that remained in the city had been “middle-class white people”). 
 10. For the purposes of this Note, only states that have codified the use of the vulnerable 
victim enhancement in sentencing are considered. The Note does not address jurisdictions in 
which this element is recognized solely by case law. See infra note 23 (cataloging states that 
only recognize a vulnerable victim for sentence-enhancing purposes through case precedent). 
 11. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 12. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 13. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 14. By “personal” the author intends to connote crimes against persons such as assault, 
robbery, rape, and murder. Crimes against property are beyond the scope of this Note, as are 
crimes against financial interests, such as fraud, that are perpetrated over long periods of time or 
occur after “order” has been restored to the scene of the natural disaster. The crux of this 
discussion is the victimization of people during and immediately after the natural disaster. See 
Laurie L. Levenson, Looting or Survival?, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 19, 2005, at 20, for a discussion of 
the legal implications of looting following Hurricane Katrina. 
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(b) explore the federal statute authorizing the use of the vulnerable 
victim enhancement in sentencing, (c) survey state statutes that have 
similarly codified the use of the vulnerable victim enhancement, and 
(d) synthesize the application of these statutes to summarize the 
characteristics necessary to classify a victim as “vulnerable.” In Part 
III, this Note will (a) define “natural disaster” in the legal sense, (b) 
delve into previous judicial applications of the vulnerable victim 
enhancement to victims of natural disasters, and (c) address the 
cautionary manner with which courts approach the characterization of 
a class of victims as “vulnerable.” 
Part IV of this Note will (a) demonstrate the effect of Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker on the ability of courts to impose enhanced 
sentences and the resulting effect on victims and criminals, and (b) 
explain how the victims of Katrina and other natural disasters possess 
the characteristics necessary to classify them as vulnerable victims.  
Part V will (a) propose that federal and state legislatures amend 
their vulnerable victim enhancements to expressly provide for victims 
of natural disaster in a way that constitutionally comports with the 
requirements set forth in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker; and (b) 
explain why objections to the classification of victims of natural 
disasters as a vulnerable class are not sufficient to render the 
proposition invalid.  
I. THE AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES HAS RECENTLY BEEN SEVERELY UNDERCUT BY THE 
SUPREME COURT 
A. A Brief Overview of Federal and State Sentencing Guidelines 
In response to “more than a decade of efforts by reformers aiming 
to curb broad discretion of federal judges and the corresponding 
disparity in sentences” Congress proposed and enacted the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).15 Following its enactment, 
the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) was formed. The 
USSC then promulgated the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
 
 15. Gary Swearingen, Proportionality and Punishment: Double Counting Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 68 WASH. L. REV. 715, 716 (1993). 
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(USSG), which took effect in 1987.16 According to the USSG, 
punishment; deterrence; protection of the public; and providing the 
defendant with “educational or vocational training, medical care, or 
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . .” are the 
federal government’s primary reasons for imposing sentences for 
criminal convictions.17 The USSG also authorizes the use of 
aggravating factors to enhance sentences when certain characteristics 
(whether of the victim, the crime, or the defendant) are present.18 
State sentencing guidelines have been created for many of the 
same reasons.19 Although state statutes regarding the purposes of 
sentencing may vary in their actual wording, the four purposes 
delineated by the federal government in the USSG are the most cited 
reasons for imposing sentences on convicted criminals. Another often 
articulated purpose of sentencing is to punish criminals with the 
severity that their culpability merits.20 Every state that has devised a 
 
 16. The United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) took effect on November 1, 1987. 1 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 introductory cmt. (2005) [hereinafter USSG]. 
The United States Sentencing Commission and the USSG effectively abolished the 
indeterminate sentencing scheme that was previously utilized by the federal courts. Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367–68 (1989). 
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000). This section states that it is necessary to impose a 
sentence on a convicted criminal for the following reasons:  
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to 
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . . . 
Id. 
 Other noted reasons for the enactment of the USSG are that Congress intended “to promote 
honesty, proportionality, and . . . uniformity in sentencing.” Swearingen, supra note 15, at 716. 
One commentator believes that the “disparity and discrimination resulting from highly 
discretionary sentencing practices, . . . concerns over increasing crime rates[,] and powerful 
criticisms of the entire rehabilitative model of punishment and corrections . . .” spurred the 
sentencing reformation undertaken by the USSG. Douglas A. Berman, Beyond Blakely and 
Booker: Pondering Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 655 
(2005) (footnotes omitted). 
 18. See USSG, supra note 16, § 3A1.1. 
 19. See generally Scott v. State, 508 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 1987); State v. Joslin, 816 P.2d 
1019, 1020 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); People v. Reed, 366 N.E.2d 1137, 1140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); 
Commonwealth v. Bland, 724 N.E.2d 723, 724–25 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); State v. Corliss, 721 
A.2d 438, 444 (Vt. 1998). 
 20. State v. Flowers, 394 S.E.2d 296, 300 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); see State v. Barts, 343 
S.E.2d 828, 847 (N.C. 1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 364 S.E.2d. 373 
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sentencing scheme has recognized the existence of aggravating 
factors and allows those factors to be used in determining criminal 
sentences. This Note is limited in scope to federal laws21 and state 
statutes22 that expressly authorize the use of delineated aggravating 
factors that support upward departures in the imposition of 
sentences.23 
Since 2000 the Supreme Court has handed down three decisions 
that have significantly altered the nature and application of 
aggravating factors under the federal sentencing guidelines as well as 
some state sentencing guidelines. These divisive decisions were 
announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, Blakely v. Washington, and 
United States v. Booker. 
 
(N.C. 1988). North Carolina courts have articulated the following purposes of sentencing: 
[T]o impose a punishment commensurate with the injury the offense has caused, 
taking into account factors that may diminish or increase the offender’s culpability; to 
protect the public by restraining offenders; to assist the offender toward rehabilitation 
and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen; and to provide a general deterrent 
to criminal behavior.  
State v. Gaynor, 300 S.E.2d 260, 262 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted). Alaska courts 
also consider the “circumstances of the offense and the extent to which the offense harmed the 
victim or endangered the public safety or order” as factors relevant to sentencing. Juneby v. 
State, 665 P.2d 30, 37 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 22. See statutes cited infra note 48 (listing the statutes of states that have authorized the 
use of aggravating factors in imposing sentences for criminal defendants). 
 23. States that solely utilize case precedent to enhance sentences by recognizing the 
existence of aggravating factors are outside the scope of this Note. See infra note 44 (defining 
an aggravating factor). The following states have considered the vulnerability of a victim as an 
aggravating factor in case law, but have not codified the factor: Colorado, in People v. Trujillo, 
75 P.3d 1133, 1139 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); Delaware, in Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296, 1297 
(Del. 1989); the District of Columbia, in Henderson v. United States, 678 A.2d 20, 21 (D.C. 
1996); Illinois: People v. Johnson, 807 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Indiana, in Hart 
v. State, 829 N.E.2d 541, 544–45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Louisiana, in State v. Galliano, 96-1736 
(La. App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97); 696 So.2d 1043; Michigan, in People v. Armstrong, 536 N.W.2d 789, 
794 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Minnesota, in Cooper v. State, 565 N.W.2d 27, 34 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997); Nebraska, in State v. Hortmann, 299 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Neb. 1980); Pennsylvania, in 
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 650 A.2d 876, 881–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Utah, in State v. Smith, 
909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995); and Wisconsin, in State v. Robinson, No. 87-0280, 1987 WL 
267446, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1987).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/9
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B. The Judicial De-Evolution of Federal and State Sentencing 
Guidelines 
In the past six years the Supreme Court has mandated major 
changes in the application and consideration of aggravating factors in 
enhancing sentences beyond their prescribed maximum. The current 
trend in this field of law began in 2000 with the Court’s decision in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey.24  
The Supreme Court in Apprendi held that the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment25 and the Sixth Amendment26 require that a 
jury must find any factor, other than a prior conviction, used to 
enhance a defendant’s sentence over the statutory maximum beyond 
a reasonable doubt.27 In Apprendi, the trial judge enhanced the 
 
 24. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 25. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in relevant part: “No 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment contention in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker is that a 
defendant is deprived of his right to due process of law if a judge has the authority to consider 
any factor he or she finds relevant for the purposes of sentencing. Initially, the Fifth 
Amendment only applied to the federal government but was made applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 30. 
 26. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: “In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker assert that part of a defendant’s right to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him is the right to be informed of any factors that 
may affect any portion of the proceedings, including sentencing. 
 27. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In criminal cases the proper evidentiary standard is 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362–63 (1970). Before 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, it was unclear whether this standard was required in 
proceedings following criminal trials. These cases made clear that the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard must be used in all proceedings related to criminal charges. Therefore, juries 
must find aggravating elements using the reasonable doubt standard instead of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard employed by the Apprendi trial judge. Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 476. 
 Charles Apprendi, Jr. pled guilty to possession of a firearm for unlawful purposes in 
violation of New Jersey law. Id. at 469–70. The maximum sentence prescribed for this offense 
was ten years, and an enhancement could be applied if the trial judge found by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the crime was committed “with a biased purpose.” Id. at 470. Finding that 
the crime was committed with a biased purpose, the trial judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve 
years in prison. Id. at 471. 
 A series of appeals brought the case before the Supreme Court. Apprendi initially appealed 
to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. Id. That court rejected 
Apprendi’s contention that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment required a jury to 
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defendant’s sentence beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum 
after he found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant 
had targeted his victims because of their race.28 Relying on 
questionable precedent,29 a majority of the Court reasoned that a 
defendant has the right to have a jury decide every element of the 
case against him, including those that would cause his sentence to be 
inflated beyond the maximum allowed by statute, beyond a 
reasonable doubt by virtue of the protections embodied in the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.30 
Blakely v. Washington31 was the next significant case to challenge 
the reach of the Court’s holding in Apprendi. At issue in Blakely was 
how the term “statutory maximum” should properly be defined for 
 
find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a biased purpose in his crime and subsequently 
affirmed his sentence. Id. Apprendi then took his appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. 
at 472. A divided bench again affirmed the initial sentence, reasoning that an essential element 
to an offense is not created simply by including that element in the sentencing provisions of the 
criminal code. Id. 
 28. Id. at 470. According to New Jersey’s “hate crime” law a judge could impose an 
enhanced sentence on a defendant who “acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or 
group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation[,] or 
ethnicity.” Id. at 469 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)). 
 29. The precedent was deemed questionable by Justice O’Connor in her dissenting 
opinion: 
In its opinion, the Court marshals virtually no authority to support its extraordinary 
rule. Indeed it is remarkable that the Court cannot identify a single instance, in the 
over 200 years since the ratification of the Bill of Rights, that our Court has applied, as 
a constitutional requirement, the rule it announces today.  
Id. at 525 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 476-77 (majority opinion). The majority reasoned:  
If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is 
committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss 
of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows 
that the defendant should not—at the moment the State is put to proof of those 
circumstances—be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably 
attached. 
Id. at 484. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are made applicable to the individual states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment states:  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 31. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
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Apprendi purposes.32 The Court declared that “statutory maximum” 
means “the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant.”33 Affirming the watershed decision in Apprendi,34 the 
Court held Blakely’s sentence invalid because the judge relied on 
“facts legally essential to the punishment” of the convicted defendant 
that a jury had not found beyond a reasonable doubt.35 
Quizzically, in Apprendi36 and Blakely,37 the Court declined to 
comment on how these decisions would affect the constitutionality of 
determinate sentencing schemes like the USSG.38 The Court came 
 
 32. Id. at 303. The state of Washington argued that the relevant statutory maximum for 
this case was the maximum sentence allowed for Class B felonies, the level of crime that 
Blakely was initially charged with, not the maximum sentence allowable given the facts of the 
case. Id. 
 Ralph Blakely admitted to a charge of second-degree kidnapping involving domestic 
violence and the use of a firearm. Id. at 298–99. In Washington second-degree kidnapping 
entails “intentionally abduct[ing] another person under circumstances not amounting to 
kidnapping in the first degree.” Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.030(1) (2000 & Supp. 
2006). 
 Finding that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, the trial judge sentenced Blakely 
to ninety months in prison. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. Under Washington law when a defendant 
acts with “deliberate cruelty” in the commission of a domestic violence crime, such action 
constitutes grounds for a departure from the sentencing guidelines. WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9.94A.535(2)(h)(iii) (2003). Blakely did not admit to (nor did a jury find beyond a reasonable 
doubt) the alleged “deliberate cruelty” enhancement that the judge later relied on when he 
upwardly departed from the applicable sentencing range. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. Therefore, 
under the state sentencing guidelines, the standard sentencing range for the facts admitted to by 
the defendant was between forty-nine and fifty-three months. Id. at 299–300. However, the state 
sentencing guidelines allowed a judge to upwardly depart from the established sentencing 
guidelines if he found “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” 
Id. at 299; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2003). 
 33. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. Once the judge considers factors relevant to sentencing, 
other than a prior conviction, that were not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or 
admitted to by the defendant he has “exceed[ed] his proper authority” under the Sixth 
Amendment even if state law allows for such a sentence based on the classification of the 
underlying crime itself. Id. at 304. 
 34. As quoted in Blakely, the holding of Apprendi reads: “Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 301. 
 35. Id. at 313. 
 36. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 n.21 (2000) (“The Guidelines are, of 
course, not before the Court. We therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this 
Court has already held.”). 
 37. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.9 (“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we 
express no opinion on them.”). 
 38. According to Black’s Law Dictionary a determinate sentence is “[a] sentence for a 
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face-to-face with that question in 2005 when the case of United 
States v. Booker39 was fast-tracked to the Court’s docket.40  
In their appeal, the United States government asked the Court to 
decide whether the “Apprendi line of cases” rendered all or a portion 
of the USSG unconstitutional, since the USSG mandated that judges 
impose enhanced sentences based on aggravating factors that were 
not found by a jury.41 Resoundingly, the Court declared that the 
USSG violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing judges, not juries, 
to determine the existence of an aggravating factor other than a prior 
 
fixed length of time rather than for an unspecified duration.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1394 
(8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK’S]. An indeterminate sentence is defined by Black’s as “[a] 
sentence of an unspecified duration, such as one for a term of 10 to 20 years [or a] maximum 
prison term that the parole board can reduce, through statutory authorization, after the inmate 
has served the minimum time required by law.” Id.  
 39. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker was convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1). Id. at 227. Title 21, § 841(a)(1) of the United States Code makes it illegal to 
knowingly or intentionally “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with the intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). 
The USSG mandated a sentence between 210 and 262 months in prison for this specific crime. 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. This range was reached by considering Booker’s criminal history and 
the amount of drugs he possessed, as determined by the jury, in accordance with the USSG 
sections 2D1.1(c)(4) and 4A1.1. Id.  
 During the post-trial sentencing proceedings the judge found by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Booker had, in fact, possessed more cocaine than the jury had found, and that he 
had also obstructed justice. Id. These other factors increased the sentencing range to between 
360 months and life imprisonment. Id. Ultimately, Booker received a thirty-year sentence—
eight years and two months beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum sentence for the 
elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. Id. 
 Booker appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Id. That court held that 
the judge’s enhancement of Booker’s punishment on his personal finding of an aggravating 
factor was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi and Blakely and 
therefore violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 227–28. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case 
to the district court with instructions to amend the sentence to be within the statutorily 
prescribed range or to hold a separate sentencing hearing before a jury. Id. at 228. The 
government petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 229. 
 40. Id.; see also Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 377, 379 (2005); Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The 
Ashcroft Memorandum’s Curtailment of the Prosecutor’s Duty to “Seek Justice,” 90 CORNELL 
L. REV. 237, 276 (2004). 
 41. Booker, 543 U.S. at 229. Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Apprendi foreshadowed this 
very question. She proclaimed “perhaps the most significant impact of the Court’s decision will 
be a practical one—its unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under current federal and state 
determinate-sentencing schemes. . . . [T]he Court does not say whether these schemes are 
constitutional, but its reasoning strongly suggests that they are not.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550–
51 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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conviction that was neither admitted by the defendant nor found 
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury when that aggravating factor 
would enhance the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutorily 
prescribed maximum.42 Accordingly, the Court declared that the 
guidelines were no longer mandatory in application but merely 
advisory.43 
 
 42. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.  
 43. Id. (striking down 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004) and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) 
(main ed. and Supp. 2003)).  
 Section 3553(b)(1) was the portion of the United States Code that purportedly made the 
USSG mandatory in application:  
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range . . . unless the court 
finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 Section 3742(e) of the Code concerned the standards of appellate review of sentences 
imposed under the USSG that departed from the recommended guideline range. In evaluating 
the sentence under § 3742(e), a reviewing court should consider whether it:  
(1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 
application of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside the applicable guideline range, 
and (A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons required by 
section 3553(c); (B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on 
a factor that—(i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or (ii) 
is not authorized under section 3553(b); or (iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; 
or (C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines 
range, having regard for the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set 
forth in section 3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of the particular 
sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or  
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline 
and is plainly unreasonable.  
Id. § 3742(e), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Currently both of 
the above-referenced sections begin with a caution to the reader that Booker has held that the 
mandatory nature of the USSG is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment and therefore 
both of these sections must be “severed and excised.” Id.  
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II. THE APPLICATION OF SENTENCE-ENHANCING FACTORS, SUCH AS 
A VULNERABLE VICTIM ENHANCEMENT, UNDER FEDERAL AND 
STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES PRE-APPRENDI, BLAKELY, AND 
BOOKER 
A. Determining Sentences in Accordance with the Goals of 
Punishment, Deterrence, Protection of the Public, and 
Rehabilitation: Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
Circumstances surrounding a crime that have the potential to 
increase a sentence beyond its statutorily prescribed maximum are 
known as “aggravating” factors.44 Conversely, circumstances that 
have the potential to decrease a sentence below its statutorily 
prescribed minimum are known as “mitigating” factors.45 The USSG 
allows judges to weigh all factors in aggravation and mitigation 
before imposing sentences.46 State statutes providing for the 
 
 44. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, an aggravating circumstance is “[a] fact or 
situation that increases the degree of liability or culpability for a criminal act . . . [or a] fact or 
situation that relates to a criminal offense or defendant and that is considered by the court in 
imposing punishment.” BLACK’S, supra note 38, at 259. Synonymous terms are aggravating 
factor, aggravating element, and aggravator. Id. at 260. 
 45. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a mitigating circumstance is:  
A fact or situation that does not justify or excuse a wrongful act or offense but that 
reduces the degree of culpability and thus may reduce the damages (in a civil case) or 
the punishment (in a criminal case) . . . [or a] fact or situation that does not bear on the 
question of a defendant's guilt but that is considered by the court in imposing 
punishment and [especially] in lessening the severity of a sentence.  
Id. The Supreme Court has maintained that the right to consider the existence of mitigating 
circumstances cannot be diminished by legislation. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). 
 46. Ideally, the USSG is supposed to be simple to utilize. Initially, the sentencing judge 
must cross-reference federal statutes with the guideline sections to determine the base offense 
level for the crime of which the defendant has been convicted. John Garry, Note, “Why Me?”: 
Application and Misapplication of § 3A1.1, the “Vulnerable Victim” Enhancement of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 151 (1993). This base offense level 
would be adjusted in light of judicial findings of aggravating or mitigating factors. Id. at 152. 
The judge would then consider other sentencing options, such as “probation, restitution, 
imprisonment, community confinement[,] and fines,” in addition to the presence of aggravating 
or mitigating factors, and then impose a sentence accordingly. Id. Ultimately proving that 
aggravating factors exist, however, does not immediately require aggravation of the defendant’s 
sentence. See, e.g., Braaten v. State, 705 P.2d 1311, 1323 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 “Sentencing facts such as aggravating and mitigating circumstances are the articulation of 
traditional considerations that assist a judge in selecting from among the options of punishment 
. . . .” People v. Whitten, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (quotation marks 
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consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors can require or 
simply allow judges to take these circumstances into consideration. 
Both the federal government47 and many state governments48 have 
codified the particular vulnerability of the crime’s victim as an 
 
omitted) (quoting People v. Hernandez, 757 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Cal. 1988)). 
 Concern exists over the proper and consistent judicial utilization of the guidelines. This 
concern is further compounded after Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker because of the now-
advisory nature of the USSG. See Katie M. McVoy, Note, “What I Have Feared Most Has Now 
Come to Pass”: Blakely, Booker, and the Future of Sentencing, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 
1629-30 (2005) (commenting that “[f]ederal judges . . . are unlikely to embrace the difficult 
task of computing guideline ranges when these ranges are merely suggested, not required”).  
 47. Section 3A1.1(b)(1) of the USSG states: “If the defendant knew or should have known 
that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim, increase [the offense level] by 2 levels.” 
USSG, supra note 16, § 3A1.1(b)(1). 
 The Commentary for this section, penned by Professor Jeffrey Standen of Willamette 
University and for the National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA), expounds upon the 
reasoning and application of this factor: 
The status or condition of the crime victim can provide for significant adjustments of 
the offense level. These adjustments are premised on the view that, all things being 
equal, crimes are more serious when directed toward certain victims. . . .  
 . . . Where the victim is especially vulnerable . . . the offender is able to complete his 
crime and avoid detection more easily and, as a result, greater penalties are required to 
ensure that crime does not pay. 
USSG, supra note 16, § 3A1.1 application n.2. 
According to section 1B1.7 of the USSG: 
The Commentary that accompanies the guideline sections may serve a number of 
purposes. First, it may interpret the guideline or explain how it is to be applied. Failure 
to follow such commentary could constitute an incorrect application of the guidelines, 
subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on appeal. Second, the commentary may 
suggest circumstances which, in the view of the Commission, may warrant departure 
from the guidelines. Such commentary is to be treated as the legal equivalent of a 
policy statement. Finally, the commentary may provide background information, 
including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying 
promulgation of the guideline. As with a policy statement, such commentary may 
provide guidance in assessing the reasonableness of any departure from the guidelines. 
USSG, supra note 16, § 1B1.7 (citation omitted). 
 48. Among states that statutorily recognize the existence of the vulnerable victim as a 
sentencing enhancing factor are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(5) (2004 & Supp. 
2005) (asserting “the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the 
offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, disability, ill 
health, or extreme youth or was for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising 
normal physical or mental powers of resistance”); California, CAL. R. OF CT., R. 4.421(a)(3) 
(West 2005) (finding “[t]he victim was particularly vulnerable”); Florida, FLA. STAT. 
§ 921.0016(3)(j) (2006) (stating “[t]he victim was especially vulnerable due to age or physical 
or mental disability”); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2005) (declaring 
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aggravating factor in imposing sentence. A crime is deemed to be 
more severe, and the criminal in need of greater punishment, when 
the crime is committed against a victim that is more vulnerable than a 
“normal” victim of the same crime would be.49  
B. The Federal Vulnerable Victim Statute: United States Sentencing 
Guidelines Section 3A1.1  
Chapter Three, Part A, Section 3A1.1(b) (“Section 3A1.1”) of the 
USSG50 reads in pertinent part: “[i]f the defendant knew or should 
have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim, 
increase by 2 levels. . . . If [the previous subdivision applies and] the 
offense involved a large number of vulnerable victims, increase the 
offense level . . . by 2 additional levels.”51 This statute is commonly 
referred to as the “vulnerable victim” enhancement.52 According to 
 
“[t]he victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or mental 
capacity which was known or should have been known to the offender”); New Jersey, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(a)(2) (West 2005) (stating that the statute “include[s] whether or not the 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim . . . was particularly 
vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, ill-health, or extreme youth, or was 
for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental power of 
resistance”); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(d)(11) (2005) (stating “[t]he 
victim was very young, or very old, or mentally or physically infirm, or handicapped”); Ohio, 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(B)(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2005) (stating “[t]he physical or 
mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense due to the conduct of the offender was 
exacerbated because of the physical or mental condition or age of the victim”); Tennessee, 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-114(5) (2003) (declaring “[a] victim of the offense was particularly 
vulnerable because of age or physical or mental disability . . . .”); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 2303(d)(4) (1998) (finding “[t]he victim of the murder was particularly weak, vulnerable 
or helpless”); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.150(2)(i)(iii) (2004) (claiming “[t]he 
victim or victims were particularly vulnerable”). 
 49. See United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 747–48 (5th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Paige, 923 F.2d 112, 113–14 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Jay Dyckman, Note, 
Brightening the Line: Properly Identifying a Vulnerable Victim for Purposes of Section 3A1.1 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1960 (1998) (thoroughly examining 
the purpose, proper application, and historical use of the federal vulnerable victim statute); id. at 
1985-87 (comparing the federal vulnerable victim statute to state vulnerable victim statutes). 
 50. Chapter Three, Part A of the USSG contains four possible adjustments for the victim-
related characteristics of the crime: hate crime motivation/vulnerable victim, official victim, 
restraint of victim, and terrorism. USSG, supra note 16, § 3A1. 
 51. USSG, supra note 16, § 3A1.1(b). 
 52. The phrase “vulnerable victim” is contained in the title of the section. Virtually all 
case law and commentary on this section refers, at some point, to this statute as the vulnerable 
victim enhancement. Accord United States v. Dock, 426 F.3d 269, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2005); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/9
p229 Johnson book pages.doc  4/17/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Thrice Victimized 243 
 
 
the National Institute of Trial Advocacy,53 Section 3A1.1 was 
enacted in the belief that crimes committed against certain victims are 
more serious than the same crimes committed against less vulnerable 
victims.54 
Before the vulnerable victim enhancement may be applied most 
federal courts require the fulfillment of, at a minimum, a two-part 
test. First, the court imposing sentence must find that the victim was 
vulnerable due to an impaired capacity to detect or prevent the 
crime.55 Second, the court must find that the defendant knew or 
should have known of the unusual vulnerability of the victim.56 Some 
courts require that the vulnerability of the victim facilitate the 
defendant in the successful commission of the crime.57 Yet other 
 
United States v. Fogg, 409 F.3d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 2005); see Dyckman, supra note 49, at 
1971. 
 53. NITA “is a dedicated team of professors, judges, and practicing lawyers who believe 
that skilled and ethical advocacy is a critical component of legal professionalism and all 
systems of dispute resolution that seek justice.” National Institute of Trial Advocacy, 
http://www.nita.org/about.htm#MISSION (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). Their mission is to 
“[p]romote justice through effective and ethical advocacy; [t]rain and mentor lawyers to be 
competent and ethical advocates in pursuit of justice; and [d]evelop and teach trial advocacy 
skills to support and promote the effective and fair administration of justice.” Id. 
 The authors of NITA’s commentary on the USSG are “partners, professors[,] and senior 
government officials.” National Institute of Trial Advocacy, http://www.nita.org/ 
commentaries.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2006). They are meant to offer a practical viewpoint 
emphasizing successful utilization of the guidelines. Id.  
 54. USSG, supra note 16, § 3A1.1 application n.2. “Where the victim is especially 
vulnerable, for example due to age or infirmity, the offender is able to complete his crime and 
avoid protection more easily and, as a result, greater penalties are required to ensure that crime 
does not pay.” Id.  
 55. See infra notes 63, 71, 81 and accompanying text. 
 56. United States v. Donnelly, 370 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. 
Anderson, 349 F.3d 568, 572 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Tissnolthtos, 115 F.3d 759, 762 
n.2 (10th Cir. 1997) (assessing defendant’s culpability by addressing the questions of whether 
the victim was actually vulnerable and whether defendant knew of that vulnerability); United 
States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1506 (2d Cir. 1992). Under California law, if a defendant 
does not object to the use of a victim’s particular vulnerability at trial, that defendant has 
waived the objection on appeal. People v. Dancer, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Zats, 298 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring the 
fulfillment of a three-part test, including a finding that the victim’s “vulnerability or 
susceptibility facilitated the defendant’s crime in some manner”); see also United States v. 
Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 500 (4th Cir. 2003) (asserting that the defendant must have targeted the 
victim due to the victim’s vulnerability); United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1344–45 (11th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Coffman, No. 97-5219, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16912, at *10 (10th 
Cir. July 23, 1998). 
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courts find the defendant’s perception of the victim’s vulnerability to 
be determinative.58  
1. Categories of Victims Recognized by Federal Courts as Being 
Particularly Vulnerable 
A tremendous amount of case law has been generated with respect 
to Section 3A1.1(b).59 Findings of vulnerability have been based on 
factors such as extreme youth or old age,60 physical or mental 
condition,61 or various other factors that render the victim particularly 
vulnerable.62 One theme reverberates from these decisions: the 
classification of a victim as vulnerable is largely fact-dependent. 
 
 58. E.g., United States v. Phillips, 287 F.3d 1053, 1057 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
O’Brien, 50 F.3d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 59. As of February 7, 2006, 595 cases cite to, discuss, or decide issues connected with 
Section 3A1.1, according to a LexisNexis search for “3A1.1” in the federal court case database. 
Using Westlaw, the USSG Guidelines Manual recommends using the following query to 
retrieve cases involving Section 3A1.1: he(u.s.s.g. +2 3A1.1) % ci(fed.appx.). 2 USSG, supra 
note 16, at app. F. 
 60. A sampling of cases that have found a victim “vulnerable” due to youth or old age are: 
United States v. Hill, 322 F.3d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Firment, 296 F.3d 118, 
121 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Curly, 167 F.3d 316, 320 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Whatley, 133 F.3d 601, 607 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 749 (10th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Somner, 127 F.3d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Salemi, 26 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th 
Cir. 1994); and United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1426 (3d Cir. 1992). Ralph V. Seep, 
Annotation, What Constitutes Unusually “Vulnerable” Victim Under Sentencing Guideline 
§ 3A1.1 Permitting Increase in Offense Level, 114 A.L.R. FED. 355, 362–67 (1993 & Supp. 
2005).  
 61. The following cases have found a victim to be “vulnerable” due to physical and/or 
mental capacity: United States v. Donnelly, 370 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2004) (involving a victim 
with Tourette’s syndrome); United States v. Hill, 322 F.3d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 2003) (concerning 
a victim that had suffered a stroke); United States v. Williams, 291 F.3d 1180, 1196 (9th Cir. 
2002) (evaluating chemical dependency and childhood rape of the victim in determining 
vulnerability); United States v. Moskal, 211 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000) (involving victims 
of car accidents as well as other vulnerabilities); United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782, 788 
(10th Cir. 1999) (finding that because the victim was intoxicated and smaller in stature than his 
attacker he was vulnerable); United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(depicting as victims residents of a care facility for the mentally challenged); and United States 
v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 655 (5th Cir. 1997) (regarding victims that were debilitated by pain or 
depression). Seep, supra note 60, at 362–67. 
 62. United States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d 102, 113 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a victim is 
more vulnerable when he is on suicide watch). Other cases have premised findings of 
vulnerability on a series of other factors: United States v. Milstein, 401 F.3d 53, 74 (2d Cir. 
2005) (premising vulnerability on the existence of fertility problems); United States v. 
Lambright, 320 F.3d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that the victim was vulnerable due to his 
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An important factor in the decision is the existence of some 
circumstance that decreases the victim’s ability to avoid becoming a 
victim of the crime.63 Setting aside extremes in age or physical 
infirmity, such characteristics could include: the fact that the victim 
was a drug user;64 a close relationship between defendant and 
victim;65 the victim’s loneliness and gullibility;66 the fact that the 
 
status as a prison inmate); United States v. Medrano, 241 F.3d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(classifying victims as vulnerable due to their inability to speak English and their unfamiliarity 
with banking practices); United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1999) (basing a 
finding of vulnerability on the victim’s status as a veteran of the Vietnam War); United States v. 
Arguedas, 86 F.3d 1054, 1058 (11th Cir. 1996) (characterizing the victimized church as 
vulnerable because the defendant targeted the church believing it to be in a precarious financial 
situation); United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 472 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that victims’ 
unfamiliarity with investment procedures rendered them vulnerable); and United States v. 
Lallemand, 989 F.2d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 1993) (establishing vulnerability on the fact that the 
victim was a married homosexual). Seep, supra note 60, at 367–70. 
 Courts have also found that the victim was not vulnerable for purposes of Section 3A1.1. 
See United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1422–23 (10th Cir. 1997) (asserting that 
prehistoric human skeletal remains are not “vulnerable victims”); United States v. Akindele, 84 
F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that random victims of identity theft were not vulnerable 
for purposes of Section 3A1.1); United States v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364, 1373 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that defendant’s wife was not unusually vulnerable to the crime of murder for hire 
because a person contracting for murder would likely know the victim); United States v. Plaza-
Garcia, 914 F.2d 345, 347 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that, when an offense already incorporates 
the factor claimed to establish vulnerability, the vulnerable victim enhancement may not be 
predicated on that factor); United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1336 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(reasoning that the fact that the victim was on the defensive because he was under indictment 
did not make him unusually vulnerable to the crime).  
 63. E.g., United States v. Rumsavich, 313 F.3d 407, 413–14 (7th Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Crispo, 306 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Drapeau, 110 F.3d 618, 620 (8th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Sangemino, 136 F. Supp. 2d 293, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Pavao, 948 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1991) (concluding that the 
victim’s drug addiction, together with her young age and closeness to family, warranted a 
finding that the victim was “vulnerable”); accord United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 470–71 
(5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the victim’s alcoholism was properly considered in 
determining whether he qualified as a vulnerable victim); see also United States v. Amedeo, 
370 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that the defendant used his knowledge of 
victim’s drug problem to accomplish the crime, thus warranting classification of the victim as 
vulnerable). 
 65. United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1991); accord United States v. 
Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the granddaughter-grandfather 
relationship is a relationship that can impart a finding of vulnerability on the victim); see also 
United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 870 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant should 
have known that the victim was vulnerable because the defendant had lived with victim and her 
mother for many years). 
 66. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 
Scurlock, 52 F.3d 531, 542 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding loneliness to be a sufficient characteristic to 
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victim was sleeping when the crime was perpetrated67; and a victim’s 
inability to escape from the location where the crime was 
committed.68 
C. Some States Have Embraced the Vulnerable Victim Concept 
Every jurisdiction that codifies the use of aggravating factors to 
enhance the sentences of criminals recognizes some form of the 
“particularly vulnerable victim” as one of those factors.69 In the 
context of state vulnerable victim statutes, “particularly” is defined as 
“in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other 
cases.”70 Similarly, “vulnerability” is defined as “defenseless, 
unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, [or] one who is 
susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.”71 Some courts have 
extended the definition of “victim” under these statutes to 
businesses.72 Though state statutes authorizing sentencing 
enhancements for vulnerable victims may vary in their wording, their 
purpose is identical to that of Section 3A1.1.73  
 
classify victim as “vulnerable” under Section 3A1.1). 
 67. United States v. Plenty, 335 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2003); accord United States v. 
Wetchie, 207 F.3d 632, 633 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 68. United States v. Tapia, 59 F.3d 1137, 1143 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 69. See supra note 48 (listing states that have statutorily codified the vulnerable victim 
enhancement for use as an aggravating factor in sentencing). 
 70. People v. Ramos, 165 Cal. Rptr. 179, 189 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 71. Id. 
 72. “[A] person or entity is a ‘victim’ under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(3) when that 
person or entity is injured, killed, had property stolen, or had property destroyed by the 
perpetrator of the crime.” State v. Lewis, 44 S.W.3d 501, 508 (Tenn. 2001) (quotation marks 
and emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Raines, 882 S.W.2d 376, 384 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1994)). 
 73. For example, California provides that “circumstances in aggravation include: facts 
relating to the crime . . . including the fact that . . . the victim was particularly vulnerable.” CAL. 
R. OF CT., R. 4.421(a)(3). This section is entitled “Circumstances in Aggravation” and can be 
found in Title Four, Division IV of the California Rules of Court. This section also provides 
that the listed factors in aggravation can be considered in sentencing “whether or not [they are] 
charged or chargeable as enhancements.” Id. at 4.421(a). On January 22, 2007, the Supreme 
Court found California’s sentencing scheme in violation of Apprendi and Booker because it 
allowed a judge to “find the facts permitting an upper term sentence.” Cunningham v. 
California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 871 (2007). 
 Kansas sentencing guidelines state “the following nonexclusive list of aggravating factors 
may be considered in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for departure 
exist: . . . [whether t]he victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity or reduced 
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1. These States May Require a Test to Determine the 
Vulnerability of the Victim Prior to Imposing an Enhanced 
Sentence 
Most states that recognize the vulnerability of the victim as an 
aggravating factor have also required the fulfillment of certain tests 
before the imposition of the inflated sentence.74 While each state 
differs, it is widely recognized that the sentencing court must find 
that (1) the victim was especially vulnerable due to a certain factor; 
and (2) that the factor made the victim more vulnerable than other 
potential victims of the same crime for whom the factor did not 
exist.75 
Two ways that a criminal may capitalize on the vulnerability of 
the victim have been characterized in case law: 1) the victim may be 
targeted because of a certain characteristic that leads the criminal to 
believe that his chances of success are far greater due to the existence 
of that characteristic; and 2) the defendant may exploit the particular 
vulnerability of the victim during the actual commission of the crime, 
knowing that the specific characteristic will impede the victim’s 
ability to effectively intervene or defend herself.76 The crux of the 
case law interpreting statutes that recognize the particular 
vulnerability of the victim as an aggravating factor is the question of 
whether the proffered characteristic renders the victim more 
vulnerable to the crime than he or she otherwise would have been. 
 
physical or mental capacity which was known or should have been known to the offender.” 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(c)(2) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).  
 74. Some state courts have agreed, in principle if not explicitly, with the federal courts 
that a two-part test must be satisfied before a sentence may be enhanced under a vulnerable 
victim statute. See, e.g., Juneby v. State, 665 P.2d 30, 32 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); State v. Davy, 
397 S.E.2d 634, 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Ramires, 37 P.3d 343, 351 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2002) (asserting that the “[i]mpostion of an exceptional sentence based upon particularized 
vulnerability requires that the victim be more vulnerable to the offense than other victims, and 
that the defendant knows of the vulnerability” (citing State v. Bedker, 871 P.2d 673, 681 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994))). 
 75. See State v. Hicks, 812 P.2d 893, 897 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
 76. See State v. Hilbert, 549 S.E.2d 882, 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); see also Braaten v. 
State, 705 P.2d 1311, 1321 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c)(6) 
(2004 & Supp. 2005) (standing for the proposition that the victim must be “substantially 
incapable of exercising normal physical or mental powers of resistance” for one of the reasons 
enumerated by the relevant statute or a similar reason). 
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2. Categories of Victims Recognized by States as Being 
Particularly Vulnerable 
There are three main categories under which a court may define a 
victim as vulnerable: advanced or tender age,77 physical or mental 
disability,78 and “any other reason” that renders a victim 
“substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental 
power[s] of resistance . . . .”79 Consistent across these categories is 
this: the characteristic of the victim that is alleged as rendering that 
victim more vulnerable cannot be considered as an aggravating factor 
unless it increases the culpability of the defendant.80 Thus, if the 
 
 77. Nelson v. State, 567 So. 2d 548, 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that a victim 
was vulnerable both because of her advanced age and because her age compounded her mental 
and physical suffering); State v. Peterson, 964 P.2d 695, 698 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (premising 
vulnerability on the fact that the defendant knew the victims were elderly and therefore knew 
they were vulnerable due to that factor); State v. Luna, 320 N.W.2d 87, 89–90 (Minn. 1982) 
(asserting that a victim is vulnerable due to young age when the victim is thirteen years old and 
the perpetrator holds a position of trust over the child); State v. Tunell, 753 P.2d 543, 548 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a three-year-old victim is vulnerable by virtue of her 
youth). 
 78. “If some disability impedes a victim from fleeing, fending off attack, recovering from 
its effects, or otherwise avoid being victimized, such a disability is a physical infirmity.” State 
v. Drayton, 364 S.E.2d 121, 122 (N.C. 1988) (quotation marks omitted).  
 State court cases that have rendered a victim vulnerable due to physical or mental disability 
include: Hasslen v. State, 667 P.2d 732, 732–33 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (asserting that a victim 
who is hit over the head and thought, by the assailant, to be unconscious is a vulnerable victim); 
People v. Chacon, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding the victim was 
vulnerable for sentence-enhancing purposes because of her sex and small stature); Berry v. 
State, 511 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (premising vulnerability on the fact that 
the victim was pregnant); Bockting v. State, 591 N.E.2d 576, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (basing 
the characterization of the victim as vulnerable on the fact that he had a history of mental 
illness); State v. Graham, 410 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a victim 
with muscular dystrophy can be considered “vulnerable” even if his impairments are not 
evident when he informs his captors of his disability); and State v. Drayton, 364 S.E.2d 121, 
122 (N.C. 1988) (reasoning that victim was vulnerable because he was rendered physically 
infirm by his high blood alcohol level, and the perpetrators targeted him because they knew he 
was under the influence). 
 79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(a)(2) (West 2005) (emphasis added); see also infra notes 
82–84 (detailing circumstances other than age and physical or mental disability upon which 
state courts have based findings of vulnerability).  
 80. State v. Barts, 343 S.E.2d 828, 845 (N.C. 1986), overruled on other grounds by State 
v. Vandiver, 364 S.E.2d. 373 (N.C. 1998) (holding that the age of a victim is not an aggravating 
factor for the purposes of sentencing unless it compounded the blameworthiness of the 
defendant). 
 The court in State v. Thompson, 348 S.E.2d 798 (N.C. 1986), stated that a criminal may 
take advantage of the age of the victim in two different ways:  
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victim possesses especially vulnerable characteristics but the 
defendant is either unaware of them or does not seek to take 
advantage of them in any way during the contemplation or 
commission of the crime, then the defendant cannot legitimately be 
subjected to a sentence enhancement for preying upon a vulnerable 
victim. Further, the characteristic that is put forth to establish the 
particular vulnerability of the victim must have impeded the victim’s 
ability to escape from the criminal conduct, to fend off the criminal, 
to recover from the effects of the crime, or to otherwise avoid 
becoming the victim of a crime.81 
Other courts interpreting the vulnerability of a victim regardless of 
the victim’s age or physical or mental capacity have found a 
multitude of factors sufficient to confer “vulnerable victim” status. 
These factors include: the relationship between the defendant and the 
 
First, he may target the victim because of the victim’s age, knowing that his chances of 
success are greater where the victim is very young or very old. Or the defendant may 
take advantage of the victim’s age during the actual commission of a crime against the 
person of the victim, or in the victim’s presence, knowing that the victim, by reason of 
age, is unlikely to effectively intervene or defend himself.  
Id. at 800 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The reader should bear in mind that this 
case only refers to age because that was the only characteristic alleged as rendering the victim 
more vulnerable. Any characteristic that renders the victim more vulnerable could be 
substituted for the word “age” and the same rationale should apply (though in light of Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker this is no longer certain). 
 81. The mere existence of a mental or physical defect, or of advanced age or extreme 
youth is not enough, by itself, to trigger the label of “vulnerable victim” and result in a sentence 
enhancement. Merely relying on the personal characteristics of the victim and discounting the 
external characteristics of the crime has consistently been a losing argument in jurisdictions that 
have codified the vulnerable victim as a sentence-enhancing factor. “A court must . . . look to 
the specific facts and circumstances surrounding a defendant’s crime to determine whether a 
particular enhancement factor is applicable.” State v. Lewis, 44 S.W.3d 501, 506 (Tenn. 2001); 
see State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175, 185 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see also People v. Dancer, 
53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (declaring “particular vulnerability is determined 
in light of the total milieu in which the commission of the crime occurred” (citations and 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)); People v. Whitten, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 126 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1994) (asserting “the scope of the information a sentencing court may consider is very 
broad and the factors which the trial court is directed to consider in determining aggravation or 
mitigation of the crime include practically everything which has a legitimate bearing on the 
matter in issue” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); People v. Ramos, 165 Cal. Rptr. 179, 
188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (“The fact that vulnerability encompasses more than age or physical 
traits justifies the rejection of appellant’s narrow construction of the rule. . . . [T]he setting of 
the crime has importance in determining vulnerability.”). 
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victim,82 the location and status of the victim at the time of the 
crime,83 and other miscellaneous factors.84 
D. Consistent Characteristics of Vulnerable Victims Under Federal 
and State Sentencing Statutes 
No hard and fast rule for determining whether a victim was 
especially vulnerable exists. What is certain is that the perceived 
vulnerability must make the victim less able to prevent or defend 
herself from being the victim of the crime or make the apparent 
success of the crime’s perpetration seem greater. Further, the criminal 
must or should have reasonably been expected to know of that 
victim’s vulnerability and assessed that vulnerability before 
committing the crime. Beyond these requirements, court decisions 
regarding the vulnerability of a victim are largely a function of 
analyzing the particular circumstances of the crime. Possibly because 
of their infrequent occurrence, the question of whether natural 
disaster victims possess the characteristics of a vulnerable victim has 
gone virtually unanswered. 
 
 82. See generally William D. Bremer, Annotation, Vulnerability of Victim as Aggravating 
Factor Under State Sentencing Guidelines, 73 A.L.R.5TH 383, 537–52 (1999) (classifying as a 
vulnerable characteristic a relationship of trust or authority, a familial relationship, a prior 
marital relationship, sexual or other abuse by the defendant, a pattern of abuse and 
reconciliation, being nude and intimate with the defendant, a befriending of the victim or 
bestowing gifts on the victim). 
 83. See id. at 552–70 (classifying as potentially vulnerable characteristics that the victim 
was a tourist; was an immigrant/visitor from another country; was at home or in an adjoining 
yard; was at work; was in the hospital; was in the wrong place at the wrong time; had been 
removed to an unfamiliar setting away from family, and been trapped with a lessened chance of 
escape; had been isolated in defendant’s residence; had been evacuated from their home due to 
flooding; was a stranded motorist; was sitting in a car; was driving a car; was riding a bicycle; 
was riding on a bus; was a pedestrian; or was hiking in a remote area). 
 84. See id. at 570–80 (classifying as a potentially vulnerable characteristic the fact that the 
victim was raised in a sheltered religious community, the crime occurred in the presence of 
victim’s child or children, the mother failed to protect the victim, the victim was disadvantaged 
financially, the victim was physically restrained, the victim had his or her underwear removed, 
the victim was outnumbered, the victim was unarmed, the victim was not expecting the assault, 
the victim was stranded after the crime, the victim’s husband was away on military deployment, 
the victim was thought to be a marijuana grower, the victim sports league was operated on 
trust). 
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III. PREVIOUS APPLICATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE VULNERABLE 
VICTIM ENHANCEMENTS TO VICTIMS OF NATURAL DISASTERS 
A. The Legal Definition of a Natural Disaster 
Defining a natural disaster does not pose much of a problem for 
federal and state entities. The following core factors, articulated by 
American Jurisprudence, tend to remain consistent across 
jurisdictions: “the phenomenon must be (1) abnormal or unusual in 
occurrence; (2) a force strictly of nature, with no human assistance or 
influence; and (3) of such severity that human prudence or precaution 
could not have avoided the damage thereby caused.”85 Considering 
the severity of natural disasters it is no wonder that they have the 
ability to “affect verdicts, judgments, and rulings on a large variety of 
legal issues.”86  
Although federal and state judges possessed the discretion prior to 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker to find that the circumstances 
surrounding a case warranted the classification of the victim as 
“vulnerable,” no court has ever explicitly held that victims of natural 
disasters are “vulnerable” under vulnerable victim statutes. In fact, 
the only case located by the author that explicitly addressed the issue 
of whether a victim is “vulnerable” following a natural disaster was 
 
 85. 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 319, § 1 (2005) (footnotes omitted). The term “natural 
disaster” is generally synonymous with the terms “act of God,” “force majuere,” and “vis 
major.” 1 AM. JUR. 2D Act of God § 2, § 4 (1964). The Second Edition of American 
Jurisprudence states:  
[A]n event may be considered an act of God when it is occasioned exclusively by the 
violence of nature. While courts have articulated varying definitions of an act of God, 
the crux of the definition typically is an act of nature that is the sole proximate cause of 
the event for which liability is sought to be disclaimed.  
Id. § 1 (footnotes omitted). 
 86. 6 AM. JUR., supra note 85, § 1; cf. Brown v. Sandals Resorts Int’l, 284 F.3d 949 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (applying South Dakota law; unusually strong winds); Skandia Ins. Co. v. Star 
Shipping AS, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (Hurricane Georges); Blythe v. Denver & 
R.G. R.y. Co., 15 Colo. 333 (Colo. 1891) (windstorm); Fla. Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 
18 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1944) (hurricane); Allen v. Simon, 04-4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/08/04); 888 
So.2d 1140 (Hurricane Lili on Oct. 3, 2002); Fulgum v. Town of Cortlandt, 770 N.Y.S.2d 416 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (Hurricane Floyd on Sept. 17, 1999); Shelby Ins. Co. v. Northeast 
Structures, Inc., 767 A.2d 75 (R.I. 2001) (high winds). 
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one involving mail fraud perpetrated upon residents of an area 
recently hit by a tornado.87  
B. Previous Application of the Federal Vulnerable Victim 
Enhancement to Victims of Natural Disasters  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the case of United 
States v. Wilson88 under Section 3A1.1. Wilson sent letters soliciting 
funds for victims of a tornado to an assortment of residents in the 
affected area.89 The defendant had no personal knowledge of the 
individual characteristics of the people to whom he mailed the 
letters.90 The court reasoned that since the defendant chose his 
victims at random and was completely unaware of their personal 
characteristics, he had not taken advantage of any particular 
vulnerability in contemplating or committing the crime.91 Therefore 
the application of a vulnerable victim enhancement to his sentence by 
the trial court was erroneous.92 According to the court: “The 
vulnerability that triggers § 3A1.1 must be an ‘unusual’ vulnerability 
which is present in only some victims of that type of crime. 
Otherwise, the defendant’s choice of a likely victim does not show 
the extra measure of criminal depravity which § 3A1.1 intends to 
more severely punish.”93  
Subsequent case law has limited the holding in Wilson.94 In 
United States v. Page95 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
 87. United States v. Wilson, 913 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 137. 
 90. Id. at 138. 
 91. Id. Wilson fraudulently solicited donations for victims of the tornado that had recently 
struck the area. Id. 
 92. Id. at 139. The fact that the town in which the victims resided had recently been struck 
by a tornado did not automatically confer upon the residents the title of “vulnerable” with 
respect to the crime of mail fraud. Id. at 138; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text 
(supporting the contention that a finding of vulnerability must be premised on more than just 
the existence of a characteristic that could make the victim more vulnerable). 
 93. Id. at 138 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329, 1335 (5th 
Cir. 1990)). 
 94. See United States v. Page, 69 F.3d 482, 490 n.7 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United 
States v. Holmes, 60 F.3d 1134, 1136 (4th Cir. 1995). But see United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 
119, 123 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 95. Page, 69 F.3d 482. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/9
p229 Johnson book pages.doc  4/17/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Thrice Victimized 253 
 
 
reasoned that Section 3A1.1 did not apply to the facts in Wilson 
because the defendant’s scheme only “happened to ensnare a few 
particularly vulnerable victims.”96 The court in Page held that when 
the crime is purposely perpetrated against the most vulnerable 
victims, even if it happens to afflict some that are not as vulnerable, 
Section 3A1.1 applies.97  
In United States v. Holmes98 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
revisited their decision in Wilson. The court distinguished Holmes 
from Wilson by stating that, in Wilson, evidence had not been 
presented to support the conclusion that the “randomly selected 
victims” of Wilson’s crime were more vulnerable than most people 
who would be asked to donate to victims of a natural disaster.99 
Therefore, the court concluded, Section 3A1.1 applies when the 
victims of a crime are purposefully chosen, either in whole or in part, 
because of their perceived vulnerability.100  
Though none of the cases following Wilson dealt with victims of 
natural disasters, their holdings apply with equal force to this group 
of people. Essentially, Wilson has been limited to instances in which 
the victims’ particular vulnerability only becomes known after the 
commission of the crime has commenced. As such, the requirements 
of Section 3A1.1 are met when a crime is perpetrated against a victim 
chosen for their perceived vulnerability regardless of whether the 
criminal was accurate in his perception. However, there is dissension 
 
 96. Id. at 490 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. at 491–92. 
 98. Holmes, 60 F.3d 1134. 
 99. Id. at 1136 n.3. 
 100. Id. at 1136–37. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on the 
commentary to Section 3A1.1 in analyzing the case of United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d at 123. In 
Smith the court held that the defendant’s actions were analogous to the coincidentally 
vulnerable victim emphasized in the commentary. Id. at 124. That portion states:  
The adjustment would apply, for example, in a fraud case where the defendant 
marketed an ineffective cancer cure or in a robbery where the defendant selected a 
handicapped victim. But it would not apply in a case where the defendant sold 
fraudulent securities by mail to the general public and one of the victims happened to 
be senile. 
Id. at 123. Therefore, Section 3A1.1 applied to victims who had been chosen for their 
vulnerability but not those that were victimized and later found to be more vulnerable. 
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among courts regarding the characterization of a broad class of 
people, such as victims of natural disasters, as vulnerable. 
C. Courts Have Exhibited a Hesitancy to Characterize Classes of 
Victims as Vulnerable 
Courts are generally hesitant to confer “vulnerable victim” status 
on classes of people.101 Following the rationale of United States v. 
Moree102 most courts have declined to confer vulnerable victim status 
on a class of people because such a blanket classification would 
remove the particularized analysis of each victim who happened to 
belong to that class.103 Moree held that a victim’s vulnerability must 
be unusual in that only some victims of that crime possess the 
vulnerable characteristic.104 For instance, bank tellers as a class are 
not more vulnerable to the crime of bank larceny than other victims 
of the same crime,105 newlyweds as a class are not more vulnerable to 
the crime of extortion than other victims,106 and South African 
nationals seeking permanent residence in the United States are not 
more vulnerable to the crime of fraud than other victims107 unless it 
can be shown that they were particularly susceptible for a reason 
other than a prerequisite condition of the crime.108 It can hardly be 
argued that being the victim of a natural disaster is a prerequisite of 
any crime. Accordingly, the characteristic that makes victims of a 
natural disaster particularly vulnerable to a crime cannot ever be one 
 
 101. See United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 486–87 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Appeals courts have 
been rather more willing to set aside determinations of vulnerability made solely on a class 
basis than when the focus was on the susceptibility of a specific individual.”). 
 102. United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 103. Id. at 1335-36; see United States v. Sutherland, 955 F.2d 25, 27 (7th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Creech, 913 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garner, No. 92-
5069, 1993 WL 24791 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 1993). But cf. United States v. Yount, 960 F.2d 955, 
957 (11th Cir. 1992) (asserting that the characterization of classes of victims as vulnerable is 
consistent with the application of Section 3A1.1). 
 104. Moree, 897 F.2d at 1335. 
 105. United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated, 506 U.S. 1043 
(1993). 
 106. Creech, 913 F.2d at 782. 
 107. United States v. Jordan, 734 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 108. Moree, 897 F.2d at 1335–36. 
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shared by “normal” victims of the crime unless the crime is only 
perpetrated against those that survive natural disasters. 
IV. THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING FOLLOWING THE 
JUDICIAL DE-EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL AND STATE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES  
A. Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker Have Opened the Door for 
Criminals to Walk Away from the Harsh Punishments Their Crimes 
Deserve, and Have Deprived Victims of the Justice Warranted by the 
Criminal Acts They Endured 
At best, Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, and their progeny symbolize 
the Supreme Court’s commitment to the preservation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial.109 These cases require that if a state 
or the federal government authorizes the use of aggravating factors in 
sentencing, other than a prior conviction, the factor should be alleged 
in an indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or 
admitted to by the defendant. Only then should the aggravating factor 
be used to enhance a criminal sentence. Legal scholars have argued 
that such a requirement is necessary to preserve the role of the jury as 
the primary fact-finder and to protect defendants against the 
subjectivity inherent in unilateral decision-making. 
Despite this contention, Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker have also 
done a great disservice to the law and to society at large. They have 
virtually stripped the USSG of its usefulness and, in the process, 
called into question state sentencing statutes and schemes.110 They 
 
 109. According to a LexisNexis Shepard’s report, 558 cases have distinguished the holding 
in Booker, and 1439 cases have followed it, as of February 6, 2006. Bearing in mind that the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision on January 12, 2005, these numbers depict the vast 
amount of litigation caused by the case. The impact of the Booker decision was so profound that 
the USSC has devoted a portion of its main website to the issues it has created. See United 
States Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/bf.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007). As of 
the same date, and according to another LexisNexis Shepard’s report, Apprendi has been 
criticized in six cases, distinguished in 1422, and followed in 1192.  
 Similarly, Blakely has been questioned once, criticized by three cases, distinguished by 
972, and followed by 760. A cursory glance at a few of these subsequent cases reveals one 
thing: both state and federal courts across the nation face innumerable questions regarding the 
proper application (and constitutionality) of their sentencing guidelines.  
 110. See Berman, supra note 17, at 653 (“[T]he future structure and operation of modern 
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sentencing systems may greatly depend on how courts and others approach the due process 
provisions and principles which lurk in the unexplored shadows of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Blakely and Booker.”).  
 Predictably the Supreme Court’s rulings in Blakely and Booker have had a noticeable effect 
on state sentencing guidelines. Those that mimicked the state of Washington’s sentencing 
statute could be called into question, as well as other statutes that failed to require that an 
aggravating factor other than a prior conviction be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury 
before being considered in sentencing.  
 Following Apprendi, and without waiting for Blakely and Booker, the Kansas Supreme 
Court declared the state’s sentencing statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated a 
defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. State v. Bradford, 34 P.3d 434, 447 (Kan. 
2001) (“‘Apprendi dictates our conclusion that Kansas' scheme for imposing upward departure 
sentences, embodied in K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-4716, violates the due process and jury trial 
rights contained in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.’” 
(quoting State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001))).  
 Arkansas was put on alert by Justice O’Connor’s reference to its sentencing statute in her 
Blakely dissent. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 323 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Spurred to action by the Court’s resounding support for Blakely in the Booker decision, the 
Arkansas legislature passed a bill entitled “An Act to Confirm That [sic] the Sentencing 
Guidelines of the State of Arkansas are Entirely Voluntary . . . .” Stephanie Gosnell, Case Note, 
Hurricane Blakely and the Calm After the Storm Found in Booker, 58 ARK. L. REV. 449, 465 
(2005). The bill was signed into law on February 18, 2005. Id. at 467; see 2005 Ark. Acts 186 
(containing the text of the codified bill).  
 Additionally, Gosnell asserted that, despite the passage of the Act, the Arkansas sentencing 
scheme might not have been subject to a Blakely attack. According to Gosnell, this is because 
Arkansas courts employ bifurcated proceedings, which permit a separate jury distinct from that 
which convicted the defendant, to impose sentence. Gosnell, supra, at 467. This session law 
confirmed that, under Arkansas’ existing sentencing scheme, judges are not required to follow 
the guidelines, but could if they so chose, in imposing sentence. Id. at 465–66.  
 Balking at the similarities between their sentencing guidelines and those struck down in 
Blakely, Minnesota recently amended state sentencing guidelines to require sentence-enhancing 
factors to be submitted to and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before they may be 
used in sentencing. Matthew R. Kuhn, Note, The Earthquake That Will Move Sentencing 
Discretion Back to the Judiciary? Blakely v. Washington and Sentencing Guidelines in 
Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1507, 1522 (2005); see MINN. STAT. § 244.10 (2005).  
 Other states sentencing schemes are more vulnerable to constitutional attack. According to 
one commentator, Pennsylvania’s sentencing statutes are prime targets for appeal under 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker in light of their applicable evidentiary standard and delineated 
finder of fact. Angelica L. Revelant, Comment, Indeterminate Immunity: A Review of the 
Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 187, 206 (2005) (“Nearly all 
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines provide that certain enhancements are not elements and 
need only be found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.”).  
 The state of Oregon’s sentencing scheme, modeled after Washington’s now-
unconstitutional guidelines, faces similar challenges as well, though one commentator sees an 
economic benefit to overturning aggravated sentences on constitutional grounds. Jesse Wm. 
Barton, The Blakely Dividend: Has the Supreme Court Made Us an Offer We Can’t Refuse?, 64 
OR. ST. B. BULL. 15 (2004). 
 Indiana, as well as every other state that authorizes the state’s judiciary to impose sentence 
enhancements for aggravating factors, has also faced indecision regarding state sentencing 
guidelines post-Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker. Joel M. Schumm, Recent Developments in 
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have effectively removed from the purposes of sentencing in the 
federal courts any guarantee of uniformity and deterrence for 
criminals contemplating especially heinous crimes. By doing so, the 
Court compromised the protection of the public. In this vein, 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker have opened the door to innumerable 
constitutional challenges regarding the imposition of any sentence 
that has taken into account any aggravating factor, and slammed it 
shut on justice.  
In the wake of the storm surge of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, 
federal and state courts are up the bayou without a paddle. Without 
mandatory consideration of statutes protecting vulnerable victims, the 
distinction now lies within the discretion of judges who cower under 
these cases. Some will deign to chance an appeal by continuing to 
impose the enhancement wherever they deem appropriate and by 
whatever evidentiary standard they choose to employ; others will 
decide that such a classification and enhancement are not worth the 
trouble of potentially having the case remanded for re-sentencing.111 
Either way one thing is clear: victims of Hurricane Katrina who fell 
victim to violent crimes in her wake may be victimized once again by 
the whirlwind of consequences of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker in 
that there is no longer any assurance that justice will be meted in 
proportion to the criminal acts these victims endured.  
B. Victims of Natural Disasters Possess the Necessary 
Characteristics to Qualify as Vulnerable Victims Under Federal and 
State Sentencing Guidelines 
Like the person with a broken leg, the person confined in an 
unfamiliar place, or the mother alone at home with her children, the 
victims of Hurricane Katrina were particularly vulnerable to crimes 
of assault, rape, robbery, and murder. After the storm raged and the 
levees failed, all of their worldly possessions and comforts were 
washed away. Battered and broken, like the city that contained them, 
these people did not possess the mental and physical fortitude to 
protect themselves from becoming victims of these atrocities. The 
 
Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure, 38 IND. L. REV. 999, 1014 (2005).  
 111. See McVoy, supra note 46. 
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mental anguish inflicted by the trauma attendant to such a disaster, 
coupled with physical exhaustion, hunger, and lack of “safe-harbors,” 
made the survivors prime and easy targets for criminal activity. 
Unlike “normal” victims of these crimes, the victimized survivors 
of Katrina were especially vulnerable to such attacks. A natural 
disaster precipitated the majority, if not all, of their present 
vulnerabilities. In some cases, a natural disaster forced them from 
their homes. If survivors were lucky enough to remain in their homes, 
all telephone communication had been interrupted by the disaster, 
which prevented them from calling for help if necessary. Those 
forced to leave their homes could fend for themselves on the streets 
of New Orleans or make their way to the Superdome or Convention 
Center, neither shelter offering much more safety than could be found 
on the streets. Family members were separated, tensions were at the 
breaking point, and no person’s well-being was assured.  
It is difficult to believe that criminals who choose to assault, rape, 
rob, or murder a person immediately following a natural disaster on 
the scale of Hurricane Katrina would be ignorant of the victim’s 
increased level of vulnerability, unlike the tornado victims in Wilson. 
Consequently, the vulnerable victim enhancement must apply to 
criminals who commit such crimes in the immediate wake112 of 
natural disasters with the knowledge that their victims are especially 
vulnerable. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker, however, there is no guarantee for the victims in 
either state or federal court that this factor will be taken into 
consideration during sentencing. 
V. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATURES SHOULD AMEND THEIR 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO EXPLICITLY PROVIDE FOR THE 
CHARACTERIZATION OF VICTIMS OF NATURAL DISASTERS AS 
VULNERABLE VICTIMS 
Initially, federal and state sentencing guidelines should be 
explicitly amended to include victims of natural disasters as 
particularly vulnerable victims for purposes of sentencing. This 
category should be limited to natural phenomena that have been 
 
 112. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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categorized by the relevant government as “disasters.”113 Such a 
definition would restrict from consideration natural occurrences that 
do not have substantial ramifications on the day-to-day functioning of 
cities, or events that fail to deprive reasonable persons of the mental 
and physical fortitude necessary to protect them from becoming 
victims of crime. Additionally, the temporal aspect of such a 
classification should be limited to the time it would take a reasonable 
person to recover their protective faculties.114 Incorporated into such 
an amendment should also be the already-present requirement that 
defendants know or reasonably should know of the victim’s 
vulnerability as a natural disaster survivor.115 
After amending federal and state vulnerable victim enhancements, 
these legislatures must revamp their sentencing guidelines to comport 
with the requirements of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker so that this 
new amendment may be constitutionally enforced.116 For federal and 
state sentencing guidelines to pass constitutional muster, the 
following changes must be implemented: prosecutors should be 
required to allege all aggravating factors they wish to be considered 
in sentencing in the indictment; these aggravating factors should be 
analyzed by a jury (which must find that each factor existed beyond a 
reasonable doubt) or admitted by the defendant; and, finally, when a 
jury finds that an aggravating factor exists, it must be considered in 
 
 113. Natural phenomena that would feasibly be included under this definition are 
hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, floods, and possibly windstorms. See Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Declared Disasters Archive, http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_ 
annual.fema (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (listing, year-by-year, all federally declared natural 
disasters dating back to 1953).  
 114. The amount of time for a reasonable victim to recover should be decided by a jury as 
well. A reasonable person is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as:  
A hypothetical person used as a legal standard . . . ; specif[ically], a person who 
exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment that society 
requires of its members for the protection of their own and of others' interests. The 
reasonable person acts sensibly, does things without serious delay, and takes proper 
but not excessive precautions.  
BLACK’S, supra note 38, at 1294. 
 115. See cases cited supra note 56 and Parts II.B, II.C.2, II.D (discussing the requirement 
that a defendant know of or reasonably should be expected to know of a victim’s vulnerability). 
 116. See discussion supra Part IV.A (outlining the changes to current sentencing guidelines 
necessary to bring them into accordance with Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker); see also McVoy, 
supra note 46, at 1621–41 (exploring the strengths and weaknesses of multiple forms of 
sentencing schemes post-Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker). 
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sentencing. These requirements comply with the constitutional 
protections of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and thus 
with the holdings of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker.117 
A. Arguments Against the Characterization of Victims of Natural 
Disasters as Vulnerable Victims Fail When the Enhancement Is 
Submitted to a Jury to Be Found Beyond a Reasonable Doubt  
Some courts have disapproved of per se classification of certain 
groups of victims as vulnerable because of a belief that each victim’s 
vulnerability is precipitated by different factors. Cases that have 
relied on this reasoning can be distinguished from cases involving 
victims of natural disasters. The vast majority of the decisions 
mandating individualized analysis of a victim’s vulnerability are 
premised on the principle that the particular vulnerability at issue is 
not the inevitable consequence of circumstances beyond the victim’s 
control (such as the vulnerabilities caused by a natural disaster). 
Contrary to the circumstances of bank tellers, newlyweds, and those 
seeking permanent residence in the United States,118 victims of 
natural disasters have no control over the circumstances that 
manufacture their particular vulnerability. 
Moreover, per se classification of victims as vulnerable is 
authorized by Section 3A1.1.119 Courts have held that the following 
classes of victims can be categorized as particularly vulnerable: the 
elderly,120 dispatched cab drivers,121 medical patients,122 black 
 
 117. Various legal scholars disagree as to whether such requirements are actually the best 
way to achieve constitutionally sound sentencing guidelines. Compare Kuhn, supra note 110, at 
1527–30, 1543 (discussing the viability of similar requirements by assessing Kansas’ 
redesigned sentencing guidelines and ultimately asserting that “other states’ legislatures, and 
possibly the United States Congress, will follow the yellow brick road to a Kansas-modeled 
guidelines system”), and Revelant, supra note 110, at 206–07 (stating that requiring prosecutors 
to allege sentence-enhancing factors in the indictment could better protect a defendant’s 
constitutional rights), with Schumm, supra note 110, at 1023 (arguing that “[a]ny sort of fix—
legislative or judicial—would create a different and complicated felony trial procedure from the 
filing of an information through discovery, trial, and sentencing”), and McVoy, supra note 46, 
at 1641 (concluding that bifurcated trials allowing a jury to find all relevant facts and a judge to 
use his discretion to apply those facts is the “most constitutionally firm” option).  
 118. See supra notes 103–06 (regarding the cases involving these classes of victims). 
 119. United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 120. United States v. Yount, 960 F.2d 955, 957 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that theft from the 
accounts of elderly victims was sufficient to warrant a sentence enhancement based on the 
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teenagers,123 and people with poor credit history.124 Victims of 
natural disasters, like victims belonging to these classes, are per se 
vulnerable victims because the circumstances surrounding their 
victimization were a major factor in their vulnerability and their 
vulnerability was created by circumstances beyond their control at 
the time of victimization. 
Further, the implementation of constitutional safeguards requiring 
a jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt if the victim and the 
disaster meet the necessary requirements removes the fear that these 
cases will not be subjected to an individualized analysis of the 
particular victim’s vulnerability.125 If jury members find that the 
requisite natural disaster did not occur they may look to the other 
provisions of the vulnerable victim enhancement. If they find that the 
victim was in fact not vulnerable and that the defendant did not 
believe any vulnerability existed then they are at liberty to reject the 
enhancement. Such procedures preserve the individualized aspects of 
vulnerable victim enhancements while clearly sanctioning the 
consideration of the occurrence of a natural disaster in such an 
analysis.  
 
vulnerable victim statute). 
 121. United States v. Malone, 78 F.3d 518, 522–23 (11th Cir. 1996) (contending that car-
jackers can victimize the driver of any car but that most drivers are not required by their job, as 
cab drivers are, to stop for and allow strangers into their vehicle, and this fact renders 
dispatched cab drivers more vulnerable than most victims of car-jackings). 
 122. United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that people 
seeking medical treatment are more susceptible to the fraudulent schemes of a person 
pretending to be a licensed doctor than other potential victims); United States v. Bachynsky, 
949 F.2d 722, 735 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding medical patients were the unsuspecting 
instrumentalities of a doctor’s fraud and therefore vulnerable victims for purposes of 
sentencing). 
 123. United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404, 411 (8th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that when 
the victims of civil rights violations live in a racially isolated place and are of young age they 
are more vulnerable than other victims of civil rights violations would be). 
 124. United States v. Peters, 962 F.2d 1410, 1417–18 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that people 
who are believed to have poor credit histories and are solicited for credit cards are more 
vulnerable than other people who would receive the same solicitation). 
 125. Contra United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
“An attack upon a vulnerable victim takes something less than 
intestinal fortitude. In the jargon of football players, it is a cheap 
shot.”126 Victimizing an already vulnerable person deserves harsher 
punishment than would be imposed if the defendant had not 
capitalized on the victim’s weakness in perpetrating the crime. 
Victims of natural disasters on the scale of Hurricane Katrina deserve 
concrete assurances that this particular vulnerability will be evaluated 
if they are criminally victimized in the wake of such events. To 
constitutionally accomplish this, federal and state sentencing 
guidelines must be amended to comport with the requirements of 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker. 
The thought of reconstructing the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines as well as individual state sentencing schemes is daunting. 
However, both systems’ guidelines must be re-evaluated, re-tooled, 
and re-enacted to comport with the requirements of Apprendi, 
Blakely, and Booker.127 A few states have already undertaken this 
great challenge; some did not even wait for the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Blakely and Booker to do so.128 To the public at large, 
the victims of violent crime, and the defendants who commit those 
crimes, the legislatures owe a duty to bring their jurisdictions in line 
with these cases. The longer each legislature waits to remedy the 
inherent defects in these statutes, the greater the number of people
 
 126. People v. Ramos, 165 Cal. Rptr. 179, 189 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (citing People v. 
Smith, 156 Cal. Rptr. 502, 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
 127. See Berman, supra note 17, at 685; Jon Wool, Beyond Blakely: Implications of the 
Booker Decision for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 285 (2005); Joshua S. 
Geller, Comment, A Dangerous Mix: Mandatory Sentence Enhancements and the Use of 
Motive, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 623, 624 (2005); Brian Haagensen II, Case Note, Blakely v. 
Washington, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 287, 300 (2005); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain 
Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1741 (2005) 
(contending that the federal legislature may not revisit the guidelines at all in the wake of 
Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker because the “political reality” is that no section of the 
government truly desires an indeterminate sentencing scheme). 
 128. See supra note 110. Overall, Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker have left state sentencing 
guidelines in turmoil and victims without the assurance that their attackers will receive 
punishment commensurate with their crime. 
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who will not receive the justice they deserve, and the greater the 
number of defendants who will not receive the punishment their 
crimes warrant. 
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